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I. INTRODUCTION

Administrative law and constitutional law, which together constitute
what we call "public law," are closely related in many ways.' For one
thing, constitutional law refers to the body of the law that sets out the
powers of public authorities by establishing the political system and
stipulates the relationship between individuals and public authorities,
while administrative law concerns "the ways in which the exercise of
public power may be held to constitutional account."'2 Thus, "it [is]
difficult to distinguish the values and principles of constitutional and
administrative law." 3 However, this does not mean that administrative
law is simply a synonym for constitutional law. Rather, constitutional
law constitutes the "background theory" under which administrative law
functions, and not the other way around. This is the reason why leading
administrative law casebooks begin with the issues centering on how
administrative law, or rather the administrative state, should be viewed
through a constitutional lens.4 Put differently, constitutional law, as the
reference point of the legal system, 5 stands apart from administrative
laws, setting the perimeters of values and principles for the latter to

1. Due to the obscure distinction between public and private law in the common
law tradition, the idea of public law in the common law world is not as clear as in the
civil law system. See R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, EUROPEAN LAW IN THE PAST AND THE
FUTURE: UNITY AND DIVERSITY OVER Two MILLENNIA 41-44 (2002). However, with the

global rise of the administrative state in the twentieth century, academic communities in
Anglo-American legal scholarship have accepted public law. See, e.g., MARTIN LOUGHLIN,
THE IDEA OF PUBLIC LAW (2003) [hereinafter LOUGHLIN, PUBLIC LAW]; JERRY L.
MASHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM, CASES

AND MATERIALS (5th ed. 2003).
2.

See DAMIAN CHALMERS & ADAM TOMKINS, EUROPEAN UNION PUBLIC LAW:

TEXT AND MATERIALS 311 (2007).
3. See Carol Harlow, Global Administrative Law: The Quest for Principles and
Values, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 187, 208 (2006).
4. See, e.g., MASHAW ET AL., supra note 1, at 59-304 (discussing the
constitutional roles of the legislative and executive powers in controlling administrative
agencies); STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY:
PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 31-140 (6th ed. 2006) (addressing the constitutional
position of administrative agencies); PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:
CASES AND COMMENTS 48-225 (Rev. 10th ed. 2003) (setting up the constitutional
framework for administration).
5. See also Bruce Ackerman, 2006 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures: The Living
Constitution, 120 HARv. L. REV. 1737, 1756 (2007).
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implement in the context of public administration. 6 Taken together,
constitutional law and administrative law are closely linked but stand as
distinct sets of legal values in our traditional legal thinking. 7
However, the relationship between constitutional and administrative

law seems to be undergoing a great transformation in the global context.
On the one hand, as an original act of "naming," the term "global

administrative law" has been given to the attempt to systematize and
rationalize the results of transboundary regulations in terms of global
governance, without looking for its constitutional underpinnings.8 On
the other, constitutionalism has been proclaimed to go beyond national
borders and prevail over the Westphalian assumption of international
relations bZ taking the practice of global governance as its own birth
certificate. For this reason, the relationship between constitutional law
and administrative law seems to become inverted when set against the
backdrop of global governance. Whether this inversion heralds a new
epoch of legal thinking and the coming of a global rule of law, or
whether it exemplifies a challenge to the rule of law in the global era,
lies at the center of this Article.
By critically examining the status of global administrative law within
the already widely acknowledged notion of "global constitutionalism," I
aim to explore the theoretical as well as normative fragmentation
6. See Harlow, supra note 3, at 207-08. For how the separation of constitutional
law from the body of nonconstitutional law plays out in legal epistemology and the
institutional structure of constitutional democracy, see Frank I. Michelman, Constitutional
Legitimationfor Political Acts, 66 MOD. L. REV. 1, 9 (2003) (identifying an epistemic
duality-the body of constitutional law and the residual body of "ordinary" legal actsinherent in the corpus juris). It should be noted that through the lens of legal realism,
this distinction between constitutional law and nonconstitutional law is the epitome of
"conceptual jurisprudence." See also GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS:
LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY'S END 24-33 (1995).

Whether conceptual or

empty, this epistemic duality has influenced the way our inherited legal system functions
and our legal thinking. See Michelman, supra. I thank Professor Francesca Bignami for
bringing the perspective of legal realism to my attention.
7. British scholar S.A. de Smith noted that "constitutional law and administrative
law... occupy[] distinct provinces, but also a substantial area of common ground." See
Michael Taggart, The Province of Administrative Law Determined?, in THE PROVINCE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1, 1 (Michael Taggart ed., 1997) (quoting S.A. DE SMITH, THE
LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION 16 (1960)).

8. See generally Susan Marks, Naming Global Administrative Law, 37 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 995 (2005).
9. See, e.g., Kanishka Jayasuriya, Globalization,Law, and the Transformationof
Sovereignty: The Emergence of the Global Regulatory Governance, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 425 (1999). See also Joshua Cohen & Charles F. Sabel, Global Democracy?,
37 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 763, 763-72 (2005).

between global administrative law and global constitutionalism. 10 While
global constitutionalism refers to the process of "constitutionalizing" an
increasingly globalized world by way of the values implicit in crossborder regulatory cooperation, the global regulatory practice at the heart
of global administrative law appears to take the place of "We the People" as
the creative force behind global constitutionalism. This relationship
between global administrative law and global constitutional law suggests
a unity of global legality, whether it be called administrative law or
constitutionalism. I argue that this "identitarian unity" between administrative
law and constitutional law in the global context poses challenges to the
ideal of the global rule of law. On the one hand, global administrative
lawyers focus on the global coordination or rationalization of administrative
policies without paying sufficient attention to their impacts on the
development of global constitutionalism. On the other hand, by premising
global constitutionalization on the practices of global regulation, global
constitutionalists overlook the problems inherent in global administrative
law itself. My analysis of these positions shows that the status quo of
global administrative law can only be maintained by "outsourcing" the
fundamental challenges to global constitutionalism. That is, global
legality is saved from fragmentation not by a unitary global public law,
but instead by assuming "legal duality" as is customary in traditional
legal thinking.
My argument proceeds as follows: Part II explores the conceptualization
of global administrative law and global constitutional law. It also
discusses whether the ways they are distinctly conceptualized point to a
unitary public law, dissolving the traditional distinction between constitutional
and administrative law. Part III examines some issues embedded in the
discourse on global administrative law and global constitutionalism. I
argue that constitutional law does not disappear from the discourse on
global administrative law but rather stands as the background against
which it is self-referentially rationalized and legitimated. In Part IV,
besides summarizing the main arguments, I conclude by suggesting that
normative issues concerning global governance cannot be fully
addressed until the relationship between global administrative law and
global constitutional law is brought to the fore in the discussion on the
global rule of law.
II. THE STATE OF GLOBAL LEGALITY
The buzzword "globalization" characterizes myriads of developments
that started prior to, or in the wake of, the collapse of the Berlin Wall,
10.

See Symposium, Global Constitutionalism, 59 STAN. L. REv. 1153 (2007).
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and has since become virtually irresistible to academic disciplines. Law
isno exception. "Legal globalization,"' 1 "the globalization of law,"'12 or
anything with an epithet evoking globalization such as the "global rule
of law"' and "globalized judiciary, '14 to name just a pair, are widespread in
legal scholarship. In this Part, I first discuss how administrative law has
been brought into the fold of globalization scholarship. Next, I proceed
to explore the way that constitutionalism has been projected beyond state
boundaries. This Part concludes with the suggestion that in terms of the
development of global administrative law and global constitutionalism, a
unitary global public law seems to be emerging, subsuming the
administrative and constitutional provinces into its territory.
A. Making Sense of GlobalAdministrativeLaw: The
Bootstrappingof Global Governance
While administrative law is conventionally discussed in the domestic
context, it has been noted that it also exists in international settings.15 In
contrast to the old "international administrative law," the identity of
global administrative law is constructed against the backdrop of emerging
global governance that transcends the boundaries of nation-states.
Global administrative law is to global governance as international
administrative law is to "international administration."' 6 The notion of
international administration, the object that international administrative
law aims to rein in, is broad, including not only international institutions
but also domestic administrative actors when they function in relation to

11. See, e.g., David Levi-Faur, The Political Economy of Legal Globalization:
Juridification,AdversarialLegalism and Responsive Regulation: A Comment, 59 INT'L
ORG. 451 (2005).
12. See, e.g., Sabino Cassese, The Globalization of Law, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 973 (2005) [hereinafter Cassese, Globalization of Law]; Martin Shapiro, The
Globalization of Law, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 37 (1993). See also Duncan
Kennedy, Two Globalizationsof Law and Legal Thought: 1850-1968, 36 SUFFOLK U.L.

REv. 631 (2003).
13.

See, e.g., Ruti Teitel, The Alien Tort and the Global Rule of Law, 57 INT'L

Soc. Sci. J.551

(2005).

14. See, e.g., Ken I. Kersch, The "GlobalizedJudiciary" and the Rule of Law, 13
GOOD SOC'Y 17 (2004).
15. See Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law,
68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 19-20 (2005). See also Daniel C. Esty, Good
Governance at the SupranationalScale: GlobalizingAdministrative Law, 115 YALE L.J.
1490, 1493-95 (2006).
16. See Kingsbury et al., supra note 15, at 18-19.

transboundary regulations.' 7 In contrast, global governance, or global
administration to which global administrative law is seen to respond, is
more complex and multifarious.
In a pioneering work on the concept of global administrative law,
Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, and Richard Stewart identify five
types of global administration, which they argue set the emerging global
administrative law apart from traditional international administrative
law.' 8 In addition to international administration and what they call
"distributed administration," both of which were formerly the objects of
international administrative law, 19 they identify three other types of
global administration: "transnational networks and coordination
arrangements," "hybrid intergovernmental-private administration," and
"private bodies., 20 To address the issues arising from global governance,
traditional administrative law tools such as procedural fairness,
transparency requirement, and accountability control are 2deployed in the
global setting, giving rise to "global administrative law." '

17. See id. at 18-20.
18. See id. at 20-23. See also Nico Krisch & Benedict Kingsbury, Introduction:
Global Governanceand GlobalAdministrative Law in the InternationalLegal Order, 17
EuR. J. INT'L L. 1, 2-3 (2006).

19. According to Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart's definition, "distributed
administration" refers to the type of administration in which "domestic regulatory
agencies act as part of the global administrative space ... tak[ing] decisions on issues of
foreign or global concern." See Kingsbury et al., supra note 15, at 21. Also, they note
that the pre-1945 "broad notions of 'international administration' included not only
"international institutions" but also "domestic administrative actors when taking actions
with transboundary significance." See id. at 19-21. Taken together, what Kingsbury,
Krisch, and Stewart calls "distributed administration" constitutes part of "broad notions
of 'international administration' in the pre-1945 international administrative law, while
"international administration" in their definition refers to the narrower notion of
"international institutions." See id.
20. In Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart's definition, "transnational networks and
coordination arrangements" as "horizontal form of administration" are "characterized by
the absence of a binding formal decisionmaking structure and the dominance of informal
cooperation among state regulators." See id. at 21. An example of this type of global
administration is the Basel Committee, under which the heads of various central banks,
"outside any treaty structure," are brought together in order to coordinate their policies
on capital adequacy requirements for banks among other things. See id. "Hybrid
intergovernmental-private administration" refers to bodies, which combine private and
governmental actors, in charge of various transboundary regulatory matters. See id. at
22. For example, the Codex Alimentarius Commission, which produces standards on
food safety that gain a quasi-mandatory effect via the SPS Agreement under the WTO
law, is composed of non-governmental actors as well as governmental representatives.
See id. As regards "private bodies" in global administration, Kingsbury, Krisch, and
Stewart discuss the private International Standardization Organization (ISO) among
other examples. See id. at 22-23. The over 13,000 standards that the ISO has adopted to
harmonize product and process rules not only have major economic impacts but are also
used in regulatory decisions by treaty-based authorities such as the WTO. See id.
21. See id. at 37-41; Esty, supra note 15, at 1524-37.
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As Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart note, informality and pluralism,
among other things, distinguish global administrative law from traditional
administrative law, both domestic and international.2 2 This is not surprising
given that global administrative law aims to tame and improve global
administration, which, as noted above, includes conventional international
administration and new types of administration. Thus, the novelty of
global administration lies not only in its containing new types of
administration but also its reconfiguring of the conventional types of
international administration in the global context. While the new types
of administration reflect the informal nature of global governance, the
coexistence of new and conventional types of administration in global
governance indicates the multifaceted constitution of global governance.
Yet, to make sense of global administrative law, a closer look at the
constitution of global governance and its role in theorizing global
administrative law is required.
New types of administration require corresponding new visions of
administrative law. Thus, with the emergence of informal types of
administration such as transnational networks and coordination
arrangements, hybrid administration, and private bodies, an informalityoriented administrative law, coexisting with traditional administrative
law in which international administrative law and domestic administrative
law occupy distinct territories, seems to be necessary.2 3 Nevertheless,
these new types of administration, together with conventional international
administration, are subsumed under the rubric of global governance, calling
for global administrative law in the place of traditional international
administrative law.
Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart regard the pre-1945 paradigm of
international administrative law, which can be traced back to the midnineteenth century, as the predecessor of global governance. 24 Still, it
differs from the emerging global administrative law in an important way.
International administration, which was at the center of traditional
international administrative law, did not go beyond the Westphalian
system and thus international administrative law did not take the place of
domestic administrative law. On the one hand, international administrative
law focused on areas such as postal services, navigation, and
22. See Kingsbury et al., supra note 15, at 53-54.
23. See id.; Esty, supra note 15, at 1537-42. See also Cassese, Globalization of
Law, supra note 12, at 976-77.
24. See Kingsbury et al., supra note 15, at 19-20 & n. 11.

telecommunication, which gave rise to "international unions, ' 25 and
indeed derived from the international union-creating treaties that were
concluded under the Westphalian system. On the other hand, international
administrative law extended to domestic administrators only when they
took actions with transboundary significance.26 Specifically, although it
has been argued that international unions were trusted "with significant
powers of secondary rulemaking which did not require national
ratification to be legally effective," these autonomous secondary
rulemaking powers only existed in fields whose regulatory framework
had been set out in treaties. 27 The drive to extend international
administration beyond international institutions to include domestic
administrators comes from the fact that their cooperation is crucial to the
implementation of unratified secondary rules. 28 The development of
international administrative law is thus rooted in the central role of
domestic administrators in the success of international administration.
In contrast, the position of domestic administrators in global
governance, from which global administrative law is derived, is not
distinct from that of other regulatory players. Rather, these administrators
share the center stage as the main players with other actors from the
private realm and international civil service. Domestic administrators,
both in international administration that involves intergovernmental
organizations established by treaties or executive agreements and in
distributed administration or other types of global administration, and
other actors are equal players in an extended sphere of global
administration.2 9 This new "global administrative space" makes global
administrative law post-Westphalian and post-Hobbesian.3 °
Global administrative law is post-Westphalian because nation-states
and their representatives do not play dominant roles in the administrative
space. In order to resolve diverse transboundary issues ranging from
core concerns such as antiterrorism responses and other national security
questions to everyday routine matters like fishery supply, national
governments need to cooperate with all possible players, regardless of
whether they operate within the national boundary.3Y Nation-states in

25. See id. at 19.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 20-27.
30. See generally Mathias Albert & Tanja Kopp-Malek, The Pragmatism of Global
and European Governance: Emerging Forms of the Political 'Beyond Westphalia", 31
MILLENNUM

-

J.INT'L STUD. 453 (2002).

31. See Cassese, Globalizationof Law, supra note 12, at 973-77. See also Sabino
Cassese, Administrative Law Without the State? The Challenge of Global Regulation, 37
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the traditional form, which occupy the center of the Westphalian world
system, no longer hold a monopoly on transboundary regulatory issues.
Instead, nation-states are disaggregating. 32 Moreover, the relationship
among the players in the global administrative space is post-Hobbesian,
in that national self-interest plays a lesser role in global administration.
The problem-solving attitude of pragmatism takes the place of realism in
addressing transboundary regulatory issues.33 Certainly, transnational
cooperation in tackling transboundary issues is no novelty, yet what
distinguishes the concept of global administrative space and the
corresponding global administrative law is that cooperative efforts are
reinterpreted through a pragmatic lens.
Specifically, this pragmatism at the heart of global administrative law
and global governance involves a twofold conceptual shift. First, given
the transboundary or global nature of contemporary regulatory issues,
administrative space, which previously centered on the nation-state, has
been reconceptualized. While traditional nation-state-centered administrative
space covers the area of the politico-juridical authority of the nationstate, this new administrative space is conceptualized in accordance with
the nature of the subject matter at issue. In other words, in traditional
administrative law, administrative space, the object of administrative
law, is defined by the source of its delegated authority. 34 Thus, nationstates, as the only source of legitimate power in the Westphalian world
system, determine the scope of administrative space. In terms of domestic
law, the nation-state constitutes the prototype of domestic administrative
space, while internationally the scope of administrative law extends only
to the subject matters that nation-states consent to delegate to
international institutions or other treaty-based regulatory mechanism.
In contrast, in global administrative law, the targeted administrative
space is determined by how and where global regulatory issues will be
best tackled.35 Thus, the scope of global administrative space is not
663, 663-670 (2005) [hereinafter Cassese, Administrative Law
Without the State].
32. See generally ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004) [hereinafter
SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER]; Anne-Marie Slaughter, Global Government Networks,
Global Information Agencies, and DisaggregatedDemocracy, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1041
(2003).
33. See Kingsbury et al., supranote 15, at 54-57.
34. See generally Jack M. Beermann, The Reach of Administrative Law in the
United States, in THE PROVINCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 7, at 171.
35. See Andreas Fisher-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime Collisions: The Vain
Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentationof Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 999,
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.

embedded in the source of legitimate power but is functionally determined
instead. As a result, nation-states function in regard to global administration
as subnational administrative districts function in regard to national
administration, except that the national constitution serves as the
reference point for the relationship between subnational administrative
districts and national administration, whereas the superimposition of
global administration on existing administrative spaces is functionally
motivated.
Second, global administrative law serves to improve the functionality
of global governance. Given that global administrative space provides a
better arena for dealing with global regulatory issues, global administrative
law adopts administrative legal tools from national experiences, with an
eye to making the decisions of global administrative players more
acceptable to those under regulation.3 6 It should be noted, however, that
these tools were developed to address the normative position of regulatory
administration in relation to other branches of power in national
constitutional systems.37 Even though there may be common procedural
mechanisms and substantive values in terms of comparative administrative
law, they materialized with reference to individual constitutional norms
and legal traditions.38
In contrast, in the global administrative space, which lacks a common
set of constitutional norms and a shared legal tradition, global
administrative law focuses on making people receptive to the decisions
of global governance. Global administrative law works to improve the
rationality of the decisions by enhancing the role of reason and
rationality in the decision-making process. Also, by providing for
reviewing mechanisms through which not only arbitrary or capricious
decisions but also irrational policies can be detected and set aside, reason
and rationality are expected to duly function in global administration.39
Global administrative law, as a discipline and as a practice, by combining its
function-driven nature and the configuration of the global administrative
1021 (2004). Cf LOUGHLIN, PUBLIC LAW, supra note 1, at 97 (noting the emergence of
"a 'systems-oriented' framework of regulatory law operating in accordance with a
'single logic of rule,' which transcends territorial units, in the post-nation-state age of
'imperial sovereignty.').
36. See Esty, supra note 15, at 1524-37.
37. For example, the enactment of Administrative Procedure Act in the United
States and the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court on administrative law are aimed to
address the needs of the administrative/regulatory state under the separation-of power
structure conceived in the American constitutional system. See BREYER ET AL., supra
note 4, at 13-37.
38. See Beermann, supra note 34. See also Peter L. Lindseth, The Paradox of
ParliamentarySupremacy: Delegation, Democracy, and Dictatorship in Germany and
France, 1920s-1950s, 113 YALE L.J. 1341, 1345-49 (2004).
39. See Kingsbury et al., supra note 15, at 37-41; Esty, supra note 15, at 1529-30.
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space transcending existing politico-juridical spaces defined by national
constitutions, is part of the bootstrapping of global governance.40 Global
administrative law helps a function-driven, pragmatic global administration
to fulfill its self-imposed telos of ushering in the global era of the
rule of law by increasing the acceptability of its decisions concerning
global regulatory issues.
B. From FunctionalAdministration to Global Constitutionalization:
A Global ConstitutionalistInitiative
As noted in the preceding section, global administrative law is
conceived without presuming a positive code of general administrative
law. Likewise, global constitutionalism emerges independently of a
world constitutional charter. 4 1 Rather, aspiring to a world order based on
the idea of the rule of law, global constitutionalists argue that even
without a world constitutional charter, the post-Cold War era has
witnessed the "constitutionalization" of the world order.42 At the heart
of the constitutionalized world order is the notion of constitutionalism,
which assumes a higher law as the reference point for the rest of the
body of the law. Along this line of thinking, global constitutionalists
claim to have discerned a set of normative values among the practice
Moreover, they argue that together with
of global governance.
normative principles rooted in traditional sources of international law,
the normative values implicit in the practice of global governance
constitute the "higher law" of the world order. 43 Corresponding to the
constitutionalization of the European Union, global constitutionalism

40. In line with Jon Elster's use of "bootstrapping," which involves a clean break
with a preconstitutional past in constitutional politics, I adopt the term here to refer to the
disconnection of theorizing a global administrative space and a corresponding global
administrative law from the existing norm-laden politico-juridical space centering on
nation-states. See Jon Elster, ConstitutionalBootstrappingin Philadelphiaand Paris, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM, IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE, AND LEGITIMACY: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

57 (Michel Rosenfeld ed., 1994).
41. A notable exception is German legal scholar Bardo Fassbender, who argues for
the United Nations Charter as the world constitution. See Bardo Fassbender, The United
Nations Charter as Constitution of the International Community, 36 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 529 (1998).
42. See Armin von Bogdandy, Constitutionalism in InternationalLaw: Comment
on a ProposalfromGermany, 47 HARV. INT'L L.J. 223, 224-25 (2006).
43. See also Mark Weston Janis, The Questfor a Higher Law, 116 YALE L.J. 317
(Supp. 2007) (book review), availableat http://yalelawjoumal.org/2007/04/07/janis.html.

extends the idea of constitutionalization without a constitution to the
global scale. 4
At the core of the global constitutionalist project of constitutionalizing
the world order without a constitution lies an "external" sociological
perspective on law, necessary to understand the new world order: "there
is a continuum between legal and nonlegal obligations and a broad
spectrum of norms that ranges from soft to hard law." 45 Outside
municipal legal systems and traditional international law, it is not a
lawless wilderness but instead "a world full
46 of law" that results from an
independent process of global lawmaking.
Various designations have been attached to the phenomenon of global
lawmaking such as "legal and constitutional pluralism," 47 "multilevel
governance, ' A 8 "societal constitutionalism,' '49 "transnational government

networks, '

50

and "cosmopolitan human rights law enforced by humanitarian

44. See, e.g., Frank Schorkopf, Constitutionalization or a Constitution for the
European Union?, in THE EMERGING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION:
GERMAN AND POLISH PERSPECTIVES 1 (Adam Bodnar et al. eds., 2003); Susan C. Breau,
The Constitutionalizationof the InternationalLegal Order, 21 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 545

(2008) (book review).
45. Jean L. Cohen, Whose Sovereignty? Empire Versus International Law, 18
ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 1, 7 (2004). See also SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note
32, at 178-81; Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, HardandSoft Law in International
Governance, in LEGALIZATION AND WORLD POLITICS 37 (Judith Goldstein et al. eds.,
2001); Gunther Teubner, 'Global Bukowina': Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in
GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3, 21 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997).

46. See Cohen, supra note 45, at 7. See also Abbott & Snidal, supra note 45, at
38-39. Cf Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Post-Modern Constitutional Theory: A Prospectfor the
Self-OrganisingSociety, 60 MOD. L. REV. 617, 623-26 (1997) [hereinafter Ladeur, PostModern Constitutional Theory] (discussing how a switch of focus from individual liberty

to group autonomy would help to overcome the regulatory challenges resulting from the
uncertainty and complexity of contemporary society in the context of liberal democracy);
Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Towards a Legal Theory of Supranationality-The Viability of the
Network Concept, 3 EUR. L.J. 33, 49-52 (1997) [hereinafter Ladeur, Towards a Legal
Theory of Supranationality](regarding the networked self-regulation of private players
in the supranational regulatory context of the EU as the predecessor of a new type of
transnational regulation).

47.

See Neil Walker, The Idea of ConstitutionalPluralism, 65 MOD. L. REV. 317

(2002). See also GAVIN W. ANDERSON, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AFTER GLOBALIZATION

39-151 (2005).
48. See Markus Perkmann, Policy Entrepreneurs, Multilevel Governance and
Policy Networks in the EuropeanPolity: The Case of the EUREGIO (2003), http://www.
lancs.ac.uk/fss/sociology/ papers/perkmann-policy-entrepreneurs.pdf.
See also Ingolf
Pemice, Multilevel Constitutionalismand the Treaty of Amsterdam: European ConstitutionMaking Revisited?, 36 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 703 (1999).
49. See Gunther Teubner, Societal Constitutionalism: Alternatives to StateCentered ConstitutionalTheory?, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTTuTONALIsM
3 (Christian Joerges et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter Teubner, Societal Constitutionalism].
50. See SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 32, at 8; Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order, 40 STAN. J. INT'L L.
283, 288 (2004).
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intervention." 5 1 At its core is what political theorist Jean Cohen calls
"the juridification of the new world order., 5 2 In traditional international
law, state consent is the legal basis for the authority of international legal
regimes5 3 and national constitutions provide the framework within which
controversies regarding state consent are resolved.
In contrast to this
Westphalian world composed of national jurisdictions, the world order
envisioned by legal globalists does not rest on state consent. Rather, it
emerges out of a global process of juridification independent of an
individual state's will and also of its constitutional framework.
What sets the global process of juridification apart from the
development of "juridification" in terms of municipal law is the way that
the law is conceived. In contrast to the court-centered concept of
domestic juridification, 5 the global process of juridification extends to
the operation of nonjudicial actors in global governance. Through the lens
of global juridification, the modus operandi of each subject field that
emerges from the practice of everyday governance is institutionalized
through myriad self-regulatory networks, developing into a networked
global legal regime. Moreover, the global legal regime generalizes and
stabilizes normative expectations in each sector of subject matter and

51. See Michael W. Doyle, The New Interventionism, in GLOBAL JUSTICE 219
(Thomas W. Pogge ed., 2001). See also SEYLA BENHABIB, ANOTHER COSMOPOLITANISM

29, 72 (Robert Post ed., 2006).
52. Cohen, supra note 45, at 2.
53.

See Martti Koskenniemi, Introduction to SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, at

xi, xii (Martti Koskenniemi ed., 2000).
54.

Compare BRUCE ACKERMAN & DAVID GOLOVE, Is NAFTA CONSTITUTIONAL?

(1995), with Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on
Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221 (1995)
(debating on the constitutionality of the ratification procedure of the NAFTA, through
which the United States expressed its consent to that international "treaty"). This
corresponds to the modem international law principle of sovereign equality in that
constitutions as the embodiment of national sovereignty are equally weighted in regard
to the domestic recognition of international law. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 287 (6th ed. 2003).

That the domestic recognition of

international law is controlled by national constitutions can be exemplified by Article 48
of the defunct draft EU Constitutional Treaty, which provides that the draft Treaty shall
be ratified by all party states according to their constitutional requirements. See Bruno
de Witte, The Process ofRatification and the Crisis Option: A Legal Perspective, in THE
EU CONSTITUTION: THE BEST WAY FORWARD? 21, 21 (Deidre Curtin et al. eds., 2005).

55. See also Lars TragArdh & Michael X. Delli Carpini, The Juridification of
Politics in the United States and Europe: HistoricalRoots, Contemporary Debates and
Future Prospects, in AFTER NATIONAL DEMOCRACY: RIGHTS, LAW AND POWER IN

AMERICA AND THE NEW EUROPE 41 (Lars TrAgtrdh ed., 2004).

thus enhances global governance.5 6 In other words, the networked
norm-making regime amounts to the function of norms autonomously
materializing in the process of globalizing governance.
To global constitutionalists, this new model of norm-making functions
noticeably as a "constitutional" order for the world,5 7 constituting the
"ultimate rule of recognition" on a global scale. 58 In this view, the question
of what is law and non-law in the traditional municipal legal %stem is no
longer decided solely by reference to national constitutions. 9 Rather,
56. Compare Bernhard Zangl, Is There an Emerging InternationalRule of Law?,
in TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE STATE? 73 (Stephan Leibfreid & Michael Ziim eds., 2005)
(noting the wide acceptance of dispute settlement procedures in four issue areas in
international law-international trade, security, labor, and environmental law-as
indicative of an emerging (quasi)intemational rule of law complementing modem states'
domestic rule of law), with Daniele Archibugi & Iris Marion Young, Envisioning a
Global Rule of Law, in TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 158 (James P. Sterba

ed., 2003) (arguing that an international criminal justice centered strategy in the place of
"war on terror" in response to global terrorism would contribute to a global rule of law
that goes beyond the existing focus on international trade, investment, and environmental
protection). This networked global legal regime results either from intergovernmental
networks of regulatory cooperation or from lex mercatoria (merchant law) and its
variations. See generally GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE, supra note 45. See also
Teubner, Societal Constitutionalism,supra note 49, at 21-23 (lex electronica and lex
mercatoria); Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Themis Sapiens: Comments on Inger-Johanne
Sand, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 49, at 67,

72-73 (lex mercatoria, lex informatica, and lex sportiva); Michelle Everson, Law and
Non-Law in the Constitutionalisationof Europe: Comments on Eriksen and Fossum, in
TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 49, at 147, 155 (lex
mercatoria and lex digitalis); Alec Stone Sweet, The New Lex Mercatoria and
TransnationalGovernance, 13 J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y 627 (2006) (lex mercatoria).
57. See TOWARDS WORLD CONSTITUTIONALISM: ISSUES INTHE LEGAL ORDERING OF
THE WORLD COMMUNITY (Ronald St. John MacDonald & Douglas M. Johnston eds.,

2005); Constance Jean Schwindt, Interpretingthe United Nations Charter: From Treaty
to World Constitution,6 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 193 (2000). See also BENHABIB,
supra note 51, at 71-72. Cf. Christian Walter, Constitutionalizing (Inter)national
Governance-Possibilitiesfor and Limits to the Development of an International
ConstitutionalLaw, 44 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 170 (2001) (proposing a segmented, as
opposed to comprehensive, version of international constitutional law). This "conceptual
shift" is related to the globalist epistemological shift to an external sociological
perspective of the law. See Cohen, supra note 45, at 7.
58. As Joseph Raz emphasizes, the rule of recognition in H.L.A. Hart's legal
theory exists as "a practice of the legal officials" and stands apart from constitutions. See
Joseph Raz, On the Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions: Some Preliminaries,in
CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 152, 160-62 (Larry Alexander ed.,

1998). Nevertheless, the sociological view of global constitutionalization brings the
practice-embedded world constitutional order closer to the Hartian rule of recognition.
The term "rule of recognition" is adopted here in a metaphorical sense. Cf Bert van
Roermund, Sovereignty: Unpopular andPopular,in SOVEREIGNTY INTRANSITION 33, 42
(Neil Walker ed., 2003) (identifying Rousseau's notion of "general will" and popular
sovereignty as "the ultimate rule of recognition" in the normative system of
democracies).
59. See Cohen, supra note 45, at 7. See also Teubner, Societal Constitutionalism,
supra note 49, at 8.
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national constitutions are part of a multilevel constitutional order in
which the distinction between law and non-law is made.
As pointed out in the preceding section, global administrative law is
tied to global governance. Moreover, the central goal of global governance
is to effectively resolve global regulatory issues through reasonable and
rational measures. Driven by this problem-solving mentality, administrative
actors in the global administrative space develop different patterns of
measures, or sector-oriented, self-referential "modi operandi," in
response to regulatory needs. Through the lens of administrative law,
many of these responsive patterns and "modi operandi," which help
administrative actors, focused on legality and consistency, to better
tackle global issues, look like an "internal administrative law" or
60
"internal law of administration" within the global administrative space.
These administrative practices concerning global governance in the eyes
of global constitutionalists are, however, transposed to the constitutional
order of the globalized world. In other words, through the theoretical
initiative of global constitutionalists, a practice that is driven by a
problem-solving mentality to make global administration functional in
the eyes of global administrative law is layered with normative
61
implications, laying the foundations for global constitutionalism.
C. Towards a Unitary GlobalPublic Law?
Taken as a whole, global governance constitutes the point of
convergence of global administrative and constitutional law. Granted,
administrative law tools are adopted to better global governance, yet the
values underpinning the traditional administrative law tools rather than
those tools themselves lie at the center of global administrative law.62
Moreover, it has been further argued that the practice resulting from the
particular character of global governance, which focuses on informality
and pluralism, represents a better translation of common administrative
law values into global administrative law. 63 In other words, global
governance itself is regarded as embodying the normative administrative

60. For the idea of "internal administrative law" or "internal law of administration," see
Jerry L. Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists:FederalAdministration and FederalAdministrative
Law in the Republican Era, 1801-1829, 116 YALE L.J. 1636, 1686, 1737-40 (2007).
61. See Cassese, Administrative Law Without the State, supra note 31, at 687-89.
See also Cassese, Globalizationof Law, supra note 12, at 985-86.
62. See, e.g., Cassese, Globalizationof Law, supra note 12, at 976-77.
63. See Kingsbury et al., supra note 15, at 55.

law values in the global context. In this way, the practice of global
governance rather than normative ideals of traditional administrative law
defines the contents of global administrative law. Global governance
and global administrative law, which connotes the efforts to apply
traditional administrative law tools to rein64 in and reform global
governance, are in a relationship of reflexivity.
It has been argued that global administrative law leaves out those
decisions concerning "important questions of principle (who should have
ultimate authority?)" and thus falls short of a "framework[] of a more
constitutionalist character., 65 Nevertheless, driven by intellectual effort
and regulatory experiences, global administrative law has been equated
with "all the rules and procedures that help ensure the accountability of
global administration., 66 Despite the ambiguity of scope of global
administrative law, global constitutionalists make much of "all the rules
and procedures that help ensure the accountability of global administration"
in their effort of constitutionalizing the globalizing world. From the
perspective of global constitutionalists, the pragmatic norm-making
process of global governance emerges as the source of higher normative
principles for the world order. In this way, global governance, which
drives the constitutionalization of the post-Westphalian world order, also
becomes the basis for global constitutionalism.67
In sum, while global administrative law scholars and global
constitutionalists occupy distinct academic legal disciplines and focus on
two distinct parts of the legal order, their fields seem to fuse into a
unitary branch of global law: global public law. 68 Is this the state of
global legality? What questions arise from this fusion, which defies the
Cf Neil Walker, EU Constitutionalism and New Governance, in LAW AND
33-36 (Griinne de Bilrca & Joanne Scott
eds., 2006) (discussing the reciprocal relationship between constitutionalism and
governance in the supranational context of the European Union).
65. See Krisch & Kingsbury, supra note 18, at 10. See also Nico Krisch, The
Pluralism of Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 247 (2006).
66. See Kingsbury et al., supra note 15, at 28. See also Neil Walker, Beyond
Boundary Disputes and Basic Grids: Mapping the Global Disorder of Normative
Orders, 6 INT'L J. CoN. L. 373, 381 (2008) (noting the expansive character of "the
Global Administrative Law project").
67. See Cohen, supra note 45, at 8. See also Fisher-Lescano & Teubner, supra
note 35, at 1014-17; Teubner, Societal Constitutionalism,supra note 49, at 7-9; Walter,
supra note 57, at 191-96. Cf Ladeur, Post-Modern Constitutional Theory, supra note
46, at 623-26 (discussing how a shift to problem-solving in regulatory strategies would
emerge as a new paradigm for the organization and exercise of public power in the postnational liberal state).
68. Cf Gunther Teubner, Global Private Regimes: Neo-Spontaneous Law and
Dual Constitution of Autonomous Sectors?, in PUBLIC GOVERNANCE IN THE AGE OF
GLOBALIZATION 71 (Karl-Heinz Ladeur ed., 2003) [hereinafter Teubner, Global Private
Regimes] (noting the emergence of global law as laying the constitutional foundations
for the globalized world order, but embedding it in private regimes).
64.

NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 15,
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traditional view of the relationship between administrative and constitutional
law? 69 These are the issues answered in Part II.
III. AN ANATOMY OF GLOBAL LEGAL UNITY: TOWARDS A
FRAGMENTED GLOBAL LAW OR BACK TO
LEGAL DUALITY?

The above discussion on the emergence of global administrative and
constitutional law within global legality suggests that these two
distinctive provinces of public law seem to be indistinct and fused into a
unitary global public law, creating what I call "global legal unity." To
clarify, by global legal unity I do not mean that a unitary public law
following the traditional pyramid structure of national legal systems has
been set up in the globalized world. The state of global legality is diverse,
pluralist, and multilayered, without an identifiable unitary source of
law. 70 Rather, global legal unity here refers to the identitarian relationship
between administrative law and constitutional law in regard to the
exercise of public power concerning global governance.
Despite the unity between global administrative and constitutional
law, a closer inspection of this global legal unity will expose the complexity
lying beneath the unitary global public law. In this Part, I aim to
establish that neither unity nor fragmentation or separation accounts for
the relationship between global administrative law and global constitutional
law. I first discuss how administrative law is constructed by leaving the
central concerns of global constitutionalism unaddressed. I then proceed
to explore the way that the issues concerning global governance and
global administrative law are left out of the discourse on global
constitutionalism. To conclude, I argue that from the perspective of
global administrative lawyers, global administrative law does not lose sight
of its constitutional counterpart. Rather, global constitutionalism stands
in the background as the "constitutive other" to the construction of the
identity of global administrative law, pointing to a relationship of duality
in global public law.

69.
70.

See supra text accompanying notes 1-7.
See Krisch, supranote 65, at 269-74.

A. Rationalizationand Legitimation Untied
Global administrative law aims to make decisions on global regulatory
issues more rational, acceptable, and thus legitimate, by making global
administration more transparent, more participatory, and more accountable.
However, participation in global administration is different from the
model of traditional political participation. Global administrative law
characteristically insulates global administration from the ordinary
traditional political process. Reasonableness and rationality constitute
the central concerns of enhancing the participation in global administration,
while reasoned analysis is the common language in the policymaking
network of global governance.71
Specifically, global governance does not derive its legitimacy from a
higher law in the way domestic administration refers to national constitutions.
Nor does it base its legitimacy on the paradigm of representative
democracy on which the principal-agent model of accountability
centers. 72 Legitimacy does not take the center stage in the discussion on
global governance anymore but is instead addressed in a more nuanced
way. What characterizes global administrative law is that policy choices
result from multiple dialogues among administrative actors in the five
types of global administration in response to social needs.73 On the one
hand, a transparent and participatory global administrative process is
regarded as an effective check on arbitrariness and caprice by exposing
possible irrational policy choices to public scrutiny. Aided by the
substantive principle of proportionality, the regulatory decisions of
global governance will come close to reason and rationality. In contrast
to traditional types of dialogue, these dialogues are conducted among
various special knowledge groups, constituting separate "epistemic
communities," so to speak. Given the prominence of reason and rationality
in the making of "sound polic[ies]" in transnational regulation, 74 the
entire network can be seen as consisting of "epistemic communities,"
including officials and civilians with "rival expertise. 75
71. See Peter L. Lindseth, 'Weak' Constitutionalism? Reflections on Comitology
and TransnationalGovernance in the European Union, 21 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 145,
148-51 (2001) (book review) [hereinafter Lindseth, 'Weak' Constitutionalism]. See also
Cohen & Sabel, supra note 9, at 764-65, 778-82.
72. Cohen & Sabel, supra note 9, at 772-84.
73. Joshua Cohen and Charles Sabel term this practice "deliberative polyarchy."
See id. at 779-84.
74. See Lindseth, 'Weak' Constitutionalism, supra note 71, at 148 (noting that
participants in "[tihe process of 'transnational' deliberative interaction" concerning the
making of public policies "must now justify their positions as 'sound policy').
75. For the issues concerning the rule by "epistemic communities," see Martin
Shapiro, AdministrativeLaw Unbounded: Reflections on Government and Governance, 8
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On the other hand, from the perspective of global administrative
lawyers, enhancing the accountability of global governance makes its
reasonable and rational regulatory choices more acceptable and thus
legitimate. Although policy discourse among experts and professionals
is more technical and goes beyond the comprehension of nonexperts, 76 it
is argued that expertise-based dialogue within the network is conducted
in a deliberative, rather than prejudiced, way compared to parliamentary
debate and street tak 77 On this view, the ideal of deliberative democracy
seems to find its institutional embodiment in global governance.78 For
this reason, despite lacking global democracy and deviating from the principalagent model of accountability, an accountable, rational, transparent
model of global administration is not undemocratic but instead
legitimate.7 9
As described above, global administrative law appears to address both
the rationality and legitimacy of global governance. It is true that
democratic legitimacy built on representative democracy is not the only
working model of legitimacy. Rather, legitimacy can be a product of
different mechanisms such as procedural fairness, systematic consistency in
policy decisions and rational results, to name just three. 80 It is also true
that these multiple models of legitimacy are not mutually exclusive, but
instead jointly enhance the legitimacy of administration. Multiple models of
legitimation notwithstanding, it is democratic legitimacy under the

IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 369, 373-74 (2001) [hereinafter Shapiro, Administrative
Law Unbounded]. But see Ladeur, Towards a Legal Theory of Supranationality,supra
note 46, at 50-51 (welcoming the increasing institutionalization of "epistemic
community" through the "comitology" process in the EU.). For the issue of "rival expertise"
resulting from the expert-centered model of administration, see Martin Shapiro,
"Deliberative," "Independent" Technocracy v. Democratic Politics: Will the Globe
Echo the E.U.?, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 341, 343-49 (2005) [hereinafter Shapiro,
"Deliberative," "Independent" Technocracy].
76. See Shapiro, "Deliberative," "Independent" Technocracy, supra note 75, at
343. Cf J.H.H. WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE: "Do THE NEW CLOTHES HAVE
AN EMPEROR?" AND OTHER ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 349 (1999) (identifying

"a general sense of political alienation" with the EU comitology).
77. See Christian Joerges, "Good Governance" Through Comitology?, in E.U.
COMMITTEES: SOCIAL REGULATION, LAW AND POLITICS 311, 312-16 (Christian Joerges &

Ellen Vos eds., 1999).
78. See Lindseth, 'Weak'Constitutionalism, supra note 71, at 150-51. See also
Shapiro, "Deliberative," "Independent" Technocracy, supra note 75, at 350-5 1.

Cf

Cohen & Sabel, supra note 9, at 779-84 ("deliberative polyarchy"). For criticism, see
WEILER, supra note 76, at 283-85.
79. See Cohen & Sabel, supra note 9, at 773-84.
80. See Esty, supra note 15, at 1518-20, 1521-23.

principal-agent paradigm that lies at the center of polemics concerning
legitimacy. The other models of legitimacy are designed to address the
challenges from democratic legitimacy. As Joshua Cohen and Charles
Sabel note, even the nascent models of accountability that are considered
to enhance the legitimacy of global governance still center on the concept of
democratic accountability based on the principal-agent model.81
This principal-agent relationship-centered concept of accountability
and democratic legitimacy is characteristic of traditional domestic
administrative law. The United States provides an example of this
phenomenon. While the accountability model has long departed from
the transmission-belt type in the development of American administrative
law, the Supreme Court has never formally abandoned the nondelegation
doctrine.82 That it has managed to reinterpret the jurisprudence of
nondelegation to allow more models of accountability to evolve to
enhance the legitimacy of administration bears testimony to the grip of
the principal-agent model in the conception of accountability and
the principal-agent
legitimacy. 83 Another example of the centrality of 84
model to administrative law is the Chevron doctrine. Considered one
of the most influential decisions in modem American administrative
law,8 5 the Court in Chevron v. NaturalResources Defense Council held
that the judiciary should defer to administrative agencies in statutory
interpretation when the statutory provision at issue is unclear. 86 While
this judicial deference is based on the expertise of administrative
agencies and their accountability to the people by way of the President,
the Court notes the premise on which administrative agencies play the
central role in interpreting statutes: "Congress has delegated policymaking
responsibilities" and agencies exercise interpretive power "within the

81. See Cohen & Sabel, supra note 9, at 773-79.
82. See generally Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Reports of the
Nondelegation Doctrine's Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1297
(2003); see also Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law,
88 HARV. L. REv.1669 (1975).
83. See Alexander & Prakash, supra note 82. For a theoretical discussion on the
grip of the principal-agent model on the conception of accountability and legitimacy, see
Cohen & Sabel, supra note 9, at 774--76.
84. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
85. See, e.g., Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory
Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHi. L. REv. 823, 823 & 824
(2006) (pointing out that Chevron is "the most cited case in modem public law" and
"one of the most important rulings in the past quarter century in American public law");
Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA L. REv. 187, 188 (2000) (noting the
Chevron decision as a "foundational, even a quasi-constitutional text").
86. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837. It should be noted that even under such
circumstances, it does not mean that the agency has a carte blanche in interpreting
statutes. Instead, agency interpretations must be reasonable.
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limits of that delegation." 87 Without Congressional delegation or beyond
the defined limits of delegation by Congress, administrative agencies
will lose the legitimacy for playing a broad role in statutory interpretation.
Leaving aside the issue of the principal-agent model of accountability
and legitimacy, noticeably there is a twofold presumption behind the
assumption of self-legitimating global governance through policy
rationality and enhanced accountability. To take the policy decisions
resulting from deliberation among epistemic committees involved in
global administration as "legitimate," first, a model rational citizenry
equipped with sufficient scientific knowledge must be presumed. Such a
citizenry dissolves the question of transparency to the extent that the
highly expertise-oriented policy discourse will no longer lie beyond the
comprehension of the public. For a multilayered, reason-centered global
administration to self-legitimate its own decisions, however, requires
more than accessibility and transparency of its policy deliberations to the
citizenry. A correspondence between the global administration and
public concerns is also needed. A multilayered global regulatory regime
self-legitimates its decisions only insomuch as the "heavily-committed
true believers" sitting on the myriad epistemic committees involved in
global administration can be considered trustees of the general
citizenry.88 Thus, on this rationalist model of legitimation, as opposed to
one based on electoral representation, is presumed a general personality
of the citizenry: citizens assume the common personality of expert,
albeit with many bodies, which is characterized by a heavily-committed
true belief in the rational and reasonable solution of public issues
regardless of who makes the decision. 89
Taken together, global administrative law does not address the rationality
and legitimacy of global governance as equally as it claims. As discussed

87. Id. at 865. See also David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation
Doctrine, 2001 S. CT. REV. 201 (2002). For how the Supreme Court subsequently
reinterpreted Chevron and limited its scope of application by an implicit invocation of
the nondelegation doctrine, see Sunstein, supra note 85, at 244-47.
88. See Shapiro, Administrative Law Unbounded, supra note 75, at 373-74
(questioning the model of governance based on "networks consist[ing] of professionals,
specialists, and heavily-committed true believers"). According to Cohen and Sabel, a
trustee-based model of accountability turns out to be no accountability. See Cohen &
Sabel, supra note 9, at 776-77.
89. See Cassese, Administrative Law Without the State, supra note 31, at 691
(suggesting scientific rationality); von Bogdandy, supra note 42, at 238 ("practical
reason"); see also Griinne de Bfirca & Oliver Gerstenberg, The Denationalizationof
ConstitutionalLaw, 47 HARV. INT'L L.J. 243, 247, 254 (2006) ("reason of the thing").

above, the legitimacy of global administration, which global administrative
law aims to satisfy by enhancing its accountability, is premised on the
aforementioned twofold presumption. However, a conception of legitimacy
based on presumption comes close to an attempt to "rationalize" the
status quo of global governance, which is oriented toward rational and
reasonable policy choices. 90 In sum, the incorporation of the values that
derive from national constitutional experiences and constitute an integral
part of a global administrative law into a multilevel global constitutional
order only results in untying the rationalization of global governance
from the issue of its legitimation.
B. Technocratic Constitutionalismwithout the People
In traditional legal thinking centering on a domestic legal system, the
constitution is distinguished from the residual body of ordinary legal
acts. Related to this conceptual duality is another evaluative duality: the
legitimacy of ordinary legal acts is translated into the question of
constitutionality; the legitimacy of the constitution itself refers to the
conceptual rubric of the constituent power, despite its multiple formations. 9 1
That the constitution stands as "the ultimate rule of recognition" for
domestic and international 92law rests on its origin in the people's
lawgiving, constituent power.
In contrast, the constitutionalization of the global legal regime by
giving normative meanings to the practice of global governance suggests
a new configuration of the legal order. The binding effect of the
emerging juridified, transnational, global regime does not rest on state
90. See Marks, supra note 8, at 997-98; Shapiro, "Deliberative," "Independent"
Technocracy, supra note 75, at 346-51; see also B.S. Chimni, Co-Option and
Resistance: Two Faces of Global Administrative Law, 37 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 799
(2005).
Global administrative law may arguably function as a mechanism of
contestation rather than cooption, opening a new front for fighting for justice. See
Kingsbury et al., supra note 15, at 52-57; Krisch, supra note 65, at 263-74. Still, the
possibility of contesting the result from the expert-minded, rationality-oriented policymaking mechanism presumes the persona of contestants, who are equally rational and
acquire rival expertise.
91. See Michelman, supra note 6, at 9. For different interpretations of constituent
power, see THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: CONSTITUENT POWER AND
CONSTITUTIONAL FORM (Martin Loughlin & Neil Walker eds., 2007).
92. See Ulrich K. Preuss, The Exercise of Constituent Power in Central and
Eastern Europe, in THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: CONSTITUENT POWER AND

supra note 91, at 211. In traditional international law, state
consent is the legal basis for the authority of international legal regimes. National
constitutions provide the framework within which controversies regarding state consent
are resolved. See supra text accompanying notes 53-54. In this sense, the constitution
also functions as the ultimate rule of recognition in deciding whether international law is
binding on particular constitutional systems. For the meaning of the ultimate rule of
recognition, see supra note 58.
CONSTITUTIONAL FORM,

460

[VOL. 10: 439, 2009]

Between Fragmentationand Unity
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.

consent. Rather, its legitimacy arises out of a dynamic process in which
players in various fields resolve a myriad of issues among themselves in
response to functional demands and the norm of efficiency. 93 These
commonly accepted solutions can take various forms, including precedents,
decisions, and standardized regulations.94 What is important is that these
effective solutions-turned-norms are also "constitutionalized," 95 supplanting
national constitutions as the "ultimate rule of recognition" in deciding
what is law and non-law.96 Unlike the relationship between the constitution
and ordinary legal acts, the process by which global governance is
juridified is regarded as the origin of global constitutionalization,
blurring the97 distinction between constitution-making and ordinary
lawmaking.
93. See Cohen, supra note 45, at 8, 13-15; see also Karl-Heinz Ladeur,
Globalization and the Conversion of Democracy to Polycentric Networks: Can
Democracy Survive the End of the Nation State?, in PUBLIC GOVERNANCE IN THfE AGE OF
GLOBALIZATION, supra note 67, at 89, 104 [hereinafter Ladeur, Conversion of
Democracy to PolycentricNetworks].
94. Cf Fisher-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 35, at 1039-40 (suggesting that
"default deference" through "mutual observation" among participants in the global
governing network plays a similar role to "stare decisis"). For the constitutionalization
of the private standard-setting process, see Harm Schepel, Constituting Private
Governance Regimes: Standards Bodies in American Law, in TRANSNATIONAL
GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 49, at 161, 164-67; Errol Meidinger,
Law and Constitutionalismin the Mirror ofNon-Governmental Standards:Comments on
Harm Schepel, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note
49, at 188, 196-97.
95. See Cohen, supra note 45, at 8. See also Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra
note 35, at 1014-17; Teubner, Societal Constitutionalism, supra note 49, at 7-9. Cf
Ladeur, Post-Modern Constitutional Theory, supra note 45, at 625-26 (suggesting that a
post-modern constitution be based on the "pre-constituted" condition of today's
"experimenting society"). But cf Walter, supra note 57, at 191-96 (arguing that
constitutionalization of international law is limited to the "various sectoral regimes, but
fails to reach the international community as a whole").
96. See supra note 58.
97. At first blush, it does not look very different from the British unwritten
constitution, which has no clear distinction between constitutional and non-constitutional
laws. Two distinctions between global constitutionalism and British constitutionalism
need to be emphasized, however. First, only the acts passed by the Parliament rather
than the practices embedded in an amorphous dynamic process of governance are
capable of changing the substance of constitutional law. Relatedly, the second difference
is in the distinction between institution and conception. It is one thing to say that due to
the institutional doctrine of parliamentarian sovereignty in British constitutionalism,
constitutional acts and nonconstitutional acts, both enacted by the Parliament, are hard to
tell apart; it is quite another to say that constitutional and nonconstitutional laws in the
British legal order are conceptually identical. I thank Mr. David Frank Barnes for
bringing the example of British common law constitutionalism to my attention.
Moreover, considering the tradition of "ancient constitution" in British constitutionalism,

From this view, global constitutionalism arises from, and is legitimated
by, the very process through which the various functional systems of
global governance interactively seek the most efficient solution to the
problems of globalization. 98 The global legal regime's self-legitimation
does not take place at the exceptional time of a "constitutional
moment." 99 Rather, global constitutionalization is embedded in the routine
operation of the institutions involved in global juridification. 10 0 Thus,
the regular adjudications by judicial bodies, the specific decisions by
regulatory agencies, and the routine negotiations among private actors
all play a role in the constitutionalization of the global legal regime.1 °1
As a result, autonomous political will, which is traditionally embodied in
the exercise of constituent power in the making of a constitution, is not
only reined in by professional and technocratic rationality, but also
"deformalized" into
the pragmatic calculation of concrete solutions to
02
particular issues. 1
Global constitutionalism takes multiple forms. Not all constitutionalists
pin the prospect of global constitutionalism on the autonomous normmaking process of administrative law. Rather, substantive values that
have been associated with the experiences of constitutional democracies
are the core of global constitutionalism. 10 3 Even so, to set themselves
"[Britain's] history [of parliamentary sovereignty] may be understood as a struggle to rid
the English of the Norman yoke and return to the fair simplicity of the Anglo-Saxon
constitution" rather than a succession of relaunching the people's constituent, lawgiving
power. See MARTIN LOUGHLIN, SWORD AND SCALES: AN EXAMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN LAW AND POLITICS 139 & n.67 (2000) (citing J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT
CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., rev. edn. 1987)).

98. See Ladeur, Conversion of Democracy to Polycentric Networks, supra note 93,
at 92-97; see also Ladeur, Towards a Legal Theory of Supranationality,supra note 46,
at 43-49.
99. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991)
[hereinafter ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE]; see also Joseph H.H. Weiler, On the Power of
the Word: Europe's Constitutional Iconography, in THE EU CONSTITUTION: THE BEST
WAY FORWARD?, supra note 54, at 3, 13; Dieter Grimm, Integration by Constitution, 3
INT'L J. CONST. L. 193, 200-01 (2005).
100. See also Ming-Sung Kuo, A Farewellto ConstitutionalAuthorship? A Critique
of the Presentist Turn in the Legitimacy of ConstitutionalDemocracy (Eur. Univ. Inst.
Working Paper MWP No. 2008/28), availableat http://cadmus.eui.eu/dspace/bitstream/
1814/9014/l/MWP_2008_28.pdf.
101. See Ladeur, Conversion of Democracy to PolycentricNetworks, supra note 93,
at 93-99; see also Teubner, Societal Constitutionalism,supra note 49, at 15-27.
102. See Cohen, supra note 45, at 18-19; Martti Koskenniemi, Constitutionalismas
Mindset: Reflections on Kantian Themes about InternationalLaw and Globalization, 8
THEORETICAL INQuIRIES L. 9, 20-21 (2007). See also Teubner, Societal Constitutionalism,
supra note 49, at 24-27. For the relationship between Schmittean autonomy of the
political and the concept of constituent power, see generally Ernst-Wolfgang
BbckenfOrde, The Concept of the Political: A Key to Understanding Carl Schmitt's
ConstitutionalTheory, 10 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 5 (1997).
103. See, e.g., Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Matthews, ProportionalityBalancing and
Global Constitutionalism,47 COLUM. J. TRANSNA'L L. 73 (2008).
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apart from moral cosmopolitans, global constitutionalists make a point
of the juridification of global governance. The world not only becomes
interdependent and globalized but is also effectively ordered in accordance
with a set of shared norms (i.e., constitutionalized). In the face of an
elusive, although not inexistent, global demos, and because of the lack of
a world constituent assembly, constitutionalists look to other sources to
make the case that cosmopolitan values are not merely moral aspirations
but have already exerted an influence on our behavior.n '0 4 Thus, the
problem-solving administrative actors, national and transnational, public
and private, involved in global administration, obviously set the best
example for how the world order should be constitutionalized.10 5 They
are the model world citizens who realize how making polices in the light
of traditional rule-of-law values will contribute to the development of
global governance. Global constitutionalists are enchanted with how
administrative actors in particular regulatory fields resolve the issues they
face effectively and acceptably, while "sectoralism" seems to dominate
on the constitutionalization or juridification of global
the discourse
10 6

governance.

104. Even if current international law suggests the possibility of its evolving into a
"common law of humankind," it should be noted that "this evolution will occur only if
most human beings acquire a global perception of themselves as part of a common
group," attaining the status of a global demos. See von Bogdandy, supra note 42, at 23337 (citing and discussing Christian Tomuschat, InternationalLaw: Ensuring the Survival
of Mankind on the Eve of a New Century, General Course on Public InternationalLaw,
in 281 RECUEIL DES COuRS 10 (1999)). Yet, as German legal scholar Armin von
Bogdandy acknowledges, "[t]here are hints that such a shift in self-perception is under
way, but the new perception has not yet established itself to such an extent that it
substantially informs many decisions on the international plane." See id. at 237. See
also Cohen & Sabel, supra note 9, at 796-97.
105. Cf. Teubner, GlobalPrivateRegimes, supra note 68, at 72-75 (arguing that the
growing private regulation, agreements, and dispute resolution mechanisms focused on
"security of expectation and solution of conflicts" as "sources of law without the state").
106. Compare Harold J. Berman, The Western Legal Tradition in a Millennial
Perspective: Pastand Future, 60 LA. L. REv. 739, 763 (2000) (indicating that in order to
form "world legal tradition," legal cultures and traditions will need to commit to
integration and to examine their belief systems in order for the "forces of world
integration [] to overcome the forces of disintegration"), with JOHN P. MCCORMICK,
WEBER, HABERMAS, AND TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN STATE: CONSTITUTIONAL,

SOCIAL AND SUPRANATIONAL DEMOCRACY 231-86 (2007) (theorizing how the new
constitutional democratic model of Europe that goes beyond the nation-state tradition
can build up in distinct social and functional "sectors"). See also Cassese, Administrative
Law Without the State, supra note 31, at 679-80; Teubner, Global Private Regimes,
supra note 68.

While the values cherished in global administrative law are widely
accepted, how they are implemented and translated into diverse
administrative fields is not beyond contestation. "Who governs and
how," the central issue concerning the legitimacy and organization of
power, not only looms in the creation of values but also in their
articulation and implementation.107 In traditional constitutionalism, this
issue lies in the hands of "We the People," whether in the form of a
constituent assembly, a referendum, or the procedural mechanisms
centering on electoral representation. 10 8 In contrast, global constitutionalists
turn to the routine operation of functional systems and the everyday
adoption of traditional rule-of-law values by players in the process of
global governance without reference to another external source of
ultimate authority such as the people. While a process of everyday
constitutionalization appears, to global constitutionalists, to be heralding
a new era for legal thinking by conflating the constituent-constituted
distinction, 0 9 on close inspection the attempt to derive constitutionalism
from governance and administrative law on the global scale looks
technocratic in the absence of the people from the scene of global
constitutionalization.

107. Compare Cassese, AdministrativeLaw Without the State, supra note 31, at 692
(speaking of the potential jurisdictional conflicts with the increase of "global
administrative courts (panels)" but leaving this issue unaddressed and emphatically
taking this increase of global administrative courts as an indicator of "the high degree of
institutionalization . . . of the global administrative system), with Shapiro,
Administrative Law Unbounded, supra note 75, at 377 (noting that "who governs and
how remains the central and pressing questions ... in the [global] age of governance
and emphasizing that "[t]he answers . . . are likely to be more complex"). See also
Krisch & Kingsbury, supra note 18, at 10; Krisch, supra note 65, at 274-77.
108. See generally ANDREW ARATO, CIVIL SOCIETY, CONSTITUTION, AND
LEGITIMACY (2000). To the extent that judicial landmark decisions stand as the lode star
for government agencies and individuals to refer to in making decisions, the judiciary
may be seen as another embodiment of "We the People." See, e.g., MIGUEL POIARES
MADURO, WE THE COURT: THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE EUROPEAN

ECONOMIC CONSTITUTION (1998). Still, a distinction needs to be drawn, at least in
theory: a judicial interpretation to substantiate the general clause of the constitution and
one that substitutes for a statutory or even constitutional provision. See Zenon
Bankowski et al., Rationales for Precedent, in INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY 481 (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1997). See
also ACKERMAN,

WE THE PEOPLE,

supra note 99,

at 86-94 (arguing

for a

"preservationist" judiciary in constitutional democracy).
109. Cf Neil Walker, Post-Constituent Constitutionalism? The Case of the
European Union, in THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: CONSTITUENT POWER AND

CONSTITUTIONAL FORM, supra note 91, at 247 (proposing a "post-constituent

constitutionalism," which would assume "a classificatory division between 'constitutive
references' and 'constituted references,"' as an alternative to current constitutional
discourses on the development of transnational constitutionalism in Europe).
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C. From Fragmentationto Duality? Making GlobalAdministrative Law
with Global Constitutionalismas the Constitutive Other
Considered overall, the seeming unity of global public law identified
in Part II consists of dual reflexivity, as suggested in the preceding two
sections. In addition to the reflexive relationship between global
governance and global administrative law," 0 reflexivity exists between
global constitutionalism and global administrative law. On the one
hand, in attempting to go beyond organizational aspects to the normative
issues of global governance, global administrative law incorporates
values that are derived from national constitutional experiences, constituting
an integral part of a multilevel global constitutional order.111 On the
other hand, global constitutionalism refers to the development of global
administrative law as the evidence for the emerging constitutionalization
of global governance. 112 In sum, the unity of global public law is
embedded in the dual reflexivity between global administrative and
constitutional law.
However, behind the guise of identitarian unity built on this dual
reflexivity lies the fragmentation, or rather separation, between global
administrative and constitutional law. At the heart of the reflexivity
between global administrative law and global constitutionalism is the
bracketing of the values and practices that emerge from the other branch
of global public law. The problems haunting the other branch are
filtered out in the reception of values and practices. As a result, global
administrative law and global constitutionalism are fragmented or
separated because they refer to, without critically reflecting on, each
other. 113
Nevertheless, from its own perspective, global administrative law does
not lose sight of global constitutional law, despite bracketing the
problems that accompany the values it adopts from the constitutional
110.

See supra text accompanying 62-64.

111.

See Frank Schorkopf & Christian Walter, Elements of Constitutionalization:

Multilevel Structures of Human Rights Protection in General Internationaland WTOLaw, 4 GERMAN L.J. 1359 (2003), available at http://www.germanlawjoumal.com/pdf/

VoI04No12/PDFVol_04_No 12_1359-1374 EuropeanSchorkopf Walter.pdf.
112.

See Cassese, Administrative Law without the State, supra note 31, at 687-89.

See also Cassese, Globalization of Law, supra note 12, at 985-86.
113. Cf Grhinne de Btirca & Joanne Scott, New Governance, Law and
Constitutionalism, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US, supra note
64, at 1, 10-11 (noting that constitutional framework has paid little attention to the "new
governance" model oftransnational administrative regulation in the EU context).

field. Global administrative law is constructed in consciousness of the
issues of a legitimacy deficit and democratic legitimacy, which are
embedded in the projection of traditional administrative law tools and
values onto the global administrative space. 1 14 Yet, to get global
administrative law going and to address the day-to-day business of
global governance pragmatically without being dragged down into
complicated theoretical debates, the fundamental issues concerning
legitimacy and democracy are left undecided, or "outsourced" to
constitutional territory. 115 In this view, global constitutionalism as a
province distinct from global administrative law in the territory of global
public law does not disappear from the perspective of those devoted to
the making of global administrative law." 16 Still, what differentiates
global public law from domestic public law is that the legitimacy of the
latter is presumed to be or to have been resolved in the constitutional
sphere. In contrast, the legitimacy of global public law is contested
either in the province of administrative law or in the space of global
constitutionalism. 117 Taken as a whole, global constitutionalism stands
in the background as the constitutive other to the construction of the
identity of global administrative law, pointing to the relationship of
duality between constitutional law and administrative law that we find
embedded in the traditional thinking of public law.18
IV. CONCLUSION
The global rule of law is an enterprise worth fighting for, not only for
practitioners but also for scholars. There are a variety of ways in which
scholars can contribute to its coming and consolidation. Both providing
advice to practitioners and setting out a modality of new discourse by
way of which the world can be seen and re-imagined in a positive light
are equally important attempts in this joint enterprise. My contribution
to this enterprise is to critically examine the status of global administrative
law in the construction of global constitutionalism.
My investigation of the relationship between global administrative law
and global constitutional law suggests the unity of global legality,
whether it be called administrative law or constitutionalism. I argue that
114.

See Esty, supra note 15, at 1502-11; see also ALFRED C. AMAN

JR., THE

DEMOCRACY DEFICIT: TAMING GLOBALIZATION THROUGH LAW REFORM (2004).

115. See Krisch, supra note 65, at 267-68, 276-78.
116. See id. at 248.
117. Compare Esty, supra note 15, at 1509-11 (discussing the legitimacy of
supranational governance through the lens of administrative procedure), with von
Bogdandy, supra note 42, at 233-37 (exploring the legitimacy of international order in
light of the constitutionalization of world federalism).
118. See Harlow, supra note 3, at 208.
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this identitarian unity between administrative law and constitutional law
in the global context consists of dual reflexivity, while on close inspection
underneath this reflexive unity is the fragmentation or separation
between global administrative law and global constitutionalism, posing
challenges to the ideal of the global rule of law. On the one hand, global
administrative lawyers focus on the global coordination or rationalization of
administrative policies without paying sufficient attention to its impacts
on the development of global constitutionalism. On the other hand, by
premising global constitutionalization on the practices of global regulation,
global constitutionalists overlook the problems inherent in global
administrative law itself. As a result, the status quo of global
administrative law can hold up only by "outsourcing" the fundamental
challenges to global constitutionalism. In sum, global legality is saved
from fragmentation not by a unitary global public law but instead by
assuming the "legal duality" we have been accustomed to in traditional
legal thinking.
Returning to the enterprise of the global rule of law, the discovery of a
presumed legal duality implicit in the construction of global administrative
law does not devalue the contribution of global administrative law to the
rationalization and legitimation of global governance because this
discovery is evocative of traditional legal thinking rather than being a
new beginning for jurisprudence. However, the danger lies in the fact
that this duality shelters the fundamental issues from being critically
reflected upon. In terms of global administrative law, they are relegated
to the field of global constitutionalism as a perceived "other," which is
necessary for the construction of global administrative law. The strategy
of making global administrative law by postulating a constitutive other
makes the legalization of global governance possible, but also provisional,
with difficult, fundamental issues undecided. 119 If my observation is
correct, it may be the case that normative issues concerning global
governance cannot be fully addressed until the relationship between
global administrative law and global constitutional law is brought to the
fore in the discussion of the global rule of law.

119. Based on the EU experience, Nico Krisch considers this an asset in the
development of the transnational rule of law. See Krisch, supra note 65, at 274-77. But
see Ulrich Haltern, A Comment on Von Bogdandy, in DEBATING THE DEMOCRATIC
LEGITIMACY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 45, 52-53 (Beate Kohler-Koch & Berthold

Rittberger eds., 2007) (questioning the fragility of contested political meaning in the
EU.).
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